



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA,
In the Field,
Fort Bowie, A.T., April 10th, 1886.

Adjutant General,
Division of the Pacific,
Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.

SIR:-

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command in the pursuit of hostile Chiricahuas. My first information of impending trouble was a telegram received on the afternoon of May 17th, 1885, and before a reply could be sent the wires between Fort Apache and San Carlos were cut. The next afternoon I was informed that Geronimo, Nana, Mangus, Natchez and Chihuahua with a considerable party had left their camp just after dark on the preceding evening. Within a few days the exact number of renegades was fixed at 34 men, 8 well grown boys and 92 women and children. I learned that on May 15th, Lieutenant Britton Davis, 3d Cavalry, sent a telegraphic dispatch, copy attached marked A, which I did not see until months afterwards. Had this telegram reached me I feel morally certain that the troubles would have been settled without an outbreak. Troubles of minor importance were constantly occurring on the reservation, which were quieted down by the officers in charge, by reporting them to me and receiving my instructions. There probably would not have been as much danger or difficulty in managing the matter reported in Lieutenant Davis' telegram as there was in quelling the disturbances started by Ka-e-a-te-na, in March and June, 1884, in which Bonita was implicated or those in July, 1885, I have not on hand papers relating to the management of these difficulties, but in each instance methods were employed suitable to the special emergency. The trouble arose from a tiswin drunk and in order to shield the guilty parties all the prominent chiefs drank of this liquor and in a body went to Lieutenant Davis and informed him of this fact, thinking that in this way all would escape punishment. Lieutenant Davis told them that in a matter of such importance he could not take action himself, but that he should report the whole occurrence to me for my directions. Lieutenant Davis wrote the telegram in the presence of the Indians and told them what he had written and said, that he should act in accordance with my personal instructions and that he would notify them what my orders were when received. A messenger was immediately sent with this dispatch to Fort Apache, but no reply was received. The Indians waited until dark and again assembled the next day, but receiving no reply became alarmed and doubtless concluded that I was making preparations to seize the whole of them and punish them as I had Ka-e-te-na. This idea I afterwards learned had been put in their heads by ill disposed persons on the reservation. A matter of this kind while it must be managed with exceeding caution must be settled promptly, without giving time for their suspicious imaginations to work on their fears. Delay is a fatal error. For further details attention is invited to the report of Lieutenant

Davis which accompanies this paper. Within an hour after the renegades left their camp on Turkey Creek, two troops of the 4th Cavalry, under command of Captain Allen Smith, 4th Cavalry, and a party of White Mountain and Chiricahua scouts under Lieutenants Gatewood and Davis, left Fort Apache in pursuit. But such was the rapidity of their flight that it was impossible to overtake them. It subsequently appeared that they travelled nearly one hundred and twenty miles without stopping for rest or food. Captain Smith's report is attached marked B. as soon as the departure of the Indians was known, troops were immediately put in motion to endeavor to overtake or intercept them. Captain Pierce with a party of scouts from San Carlos moved towards Ash Peak. The Commanding Officer Fort Thomas without waiting for orders sent two companies of cavalry towards Clifton. The Commanding Officer Fort Grant was ordered to send all his available force of five troops of cavalry towards the Gila with orders to cut their trail if possible and to pursue vigorously regardless of Departmental or National lines. The Commanding Officer, Fort Bowie was directed to ambush his cavalry at proper points in the Steins Peak range, which had been a favorite trail in former years. The Commanding Officer Fort Huachuca was instructed to send three troops to Guadalupe Cañon and to scout the whole country in that vicinity. Information was sent to the Commanding Officer District of New Mexico, of the departure of the Indians and the movements of my troops, and finally every effort was made to warn citizens at all points within reach of danger. On the 28th of May my information indicating that the Indians had gone into the Black Range, New Mexico, I left my headquarters and proceeded to Fort Bayard, whence I could more intelligently direct the movement of troops from this Department. The whole country north, east and west of Bayard was filled with troops. No less than twenty troops of cavalry and more than one hundred Indian Scouts were moved in every direction, either to intercept or follow the trails of the hostiles. But with the exception of the capture of a few animals by the Indian scouts under Chatto, and a slight skirmish with their rear guard by the troops from Apache under Captain Smith May 22nd, in which three of his command were wounded, the Indians were not even caught sight of by the troops and finally crossed into Mexico about June 10th. In the 23 days from the outbreak until the Indians crossed into Mexico, every possible effort was made by the troops which were pushed to the limit of endurance of men and animals, but without result other than to drive the Indians out of the Black Range and Mogollons and also to save the lives probable of many ranchmen and prospectors. It must be remembered that the two years of peace had enormously increased the business interests of Arizona and the contiguous portions of New Mexico. Cattle and horse ranches had been established wherever a mountain stream afforded the necessary water. Thus the Indians found food and transportation in every valley, whereas the troops pursuing were limited to the horses they were riding and to the rations carried on their pack trains. The vigor of the pursuit may be understood from the fact that probable more than one hundred and fifty horses and mules were found on the different trails, which had been worn out and killed or abandoned by the Indians in their flight. As soon as it became evident that the Indians were moving south I proceeded to Deming on June 5th, and began preparations to follow them into Mexico. Captain Crawford, 3d Cavalry, who had reported to me was ordered with the battalion of scouts which had been operating

in the country about the old Warm Spring Reservation, to Separ by rail, and thence to move with a troop of Cavalry to the south end of the Animas Valley, with the hope that the Indians might cross into Mexico through the Guadalupe Mountains. The result proved that the main body of the hostiles crossed the line to the West of the Mule Mountains, though a small party surprised a camp of the 4th Cavalry in Guadalupe Canon guarded by a party of seven enlisted men, killing four of them, and another small party crossed the line near Lake Palomas. Lieutenant Davis, who with sixty White Mountain and Chiricahua scouts, had been following the trail of the Indians as rapidly as possible, was ordered to report to Captain Crawford and on the 11th of June the combined force consisting of 92 scouts and troop A, 6th Cavalry, followed the hostiles into the Sierra Madre. On the 9th of June a telegram "copy attached marked C" was received from Lieutenant General Sheridan, informing me that I was authorized to enlist 200 additional scouts and the Cheyenne pack-trains had been ordered to report to me, and directing that I establish my headquarters at a point either on or near the Southern Pacific Railroad. I accordingly proceeded to Fort Bowie, directions were immediately issued for the enlistment of the new scouts, 100 at San Carlos and the remainder at Fort Apache. As soon as the 100 at Apache were enlisted, Lieutenant Gatewood was ordered in command to thoroughly scout the Mogollons and Black Range, in order to definitely determine whether any of the Indians were remaining in that region as was persistently reported. This movement delayed his arrival at Bowie about 20 days and though it was found, as I supposed, that there were no hostiles in New Mexico, I did not think it advisable to organize a second expedition for service in Mexico until this fact was definitely established. As soon as necessary preparations could be completed, Captain Wirt Davis, 4th Cavalry, with a command consisting of his own troop of cavalry, and 100 Indian scouts with pack-trains, carrying 60 days rations, was ordered into Mexico. My plan of operations was as follows: That the commands of Captains Davis and Crawford should thoroughly scout the Sierra Madre and the adjoining mountain ranges and endeavor to surprise the hostile camps in Mexico and at the same time to so station troops along the border as to prevent if possible the return of the renegades to the United States when they were driven out of Mexico by the commands operating in the mountains. With this in view I placed a troop of cavalry at every water hole along the border from the Patagonia Mountains to the Rio Grande. With each troop I placed a detachment of Indians scouts with sufficient pack mules to carry at least ten days rations for the command. Orders were given to conceal the troops and to keep the country between the different camps constantly patrolled. I also established a second line near the railroad as reserves to the first line. In order to insure prompt supplies to the commands operating in Mexico, I established a depot at Lang's ranch at the south end of the Animas Valley near the boundary. In New Mexico reserve camps were also established at such points as seemed to offer the best facilities for rapid movement and successful pursuit, in the event that the renegades should return to the United States. Four troops of the 8th Cavalry from Texas having reported to General Bradley, were stationed north of the railroad at such points as were considered as being most available for the pursuit of the Indians and most likely to afford protection to life and property. On the 23d of June Capt.

Crawford's scouts under Chatto struck Chihuahuas band in the Bavispe mountains, north-east of Opute, but owing to the position occupied by the hostiles their camp could not be surrounded and in the fight which ensued the hostiles escaped. 15 women and children, a number of horses, and a considerable amount of plunder was captured. "A report of this affair is attached marked D", Capt. Davis, 4th Cavalry, crossed into Mexico July 13th and after much severe fatigue succeeded in locating the camp of the band of hostiles under Geronimo in the Sierra Madre a little north-east of Nacori. The camp was attacked by a picked detail of 78 scouts under Lieutenant Day, 9th Cavalry, and though the surprise was complete, it is now believed that the only Indians killed were one squaw and two boys. Everything in the camp was captured and 15 women and children. A copy of Captain Davis's report of this affair was forwarded at the time. Captain Davis and Crawford continued scouting in the mountains and their commands suffered and endured uncomplainingly almost incredible fatigues. But the Indians were so constantly on the alert that no further engagement was had, until on September 22d, Captain Davis again struck a band of about 20 hostiles in the Terris mountains and in the fight that ensued one of his scouts was killed. The Indians having been driven out of Mexico by the scouts, crossed into the United States through Guadalupe Cañon within a few miles of a camp of two troops of cavalry about daylight on the morning of September 28th. They were closely followed by both Captain Davis and Crawford, it being evident that the hostiles intended to raid the White Mountain Reservation or going to the Mogollons or Black Range in New Mexico dispositions were made to prevent this. Cavalry were directed ~~to~~ from different points by converging routes towards the Gila. Troops were established in position to prevent the Indians crossing the San Simon Valley into the Steins Peak Range: others were placed along the railroad where they would be available for instant transportation by rail to threatened points. The scouts followed the hostiles and several troops of cavalry were moved to points where it was thought possible that they might ambush them. The renegades took the roughest possible trail over the Chiricahuas, twice endeavored to cross the San Simon Valley, but each time was frightened back into the Chiricahuas either by seeing the dust of moving columns or discovering their trails across the valley. They then crossed the Sulphur Spring Valley, by night into the Dragoons whither they were followed by Crawford's Scouts, through this range back into the valley, south towards the Mule mountains, when their trail suddenly turned sharp to the east and went back into the Chiricahuas, Crawford's scouts followed persistently. The stock of the hostiles by this time was worn out and though they had gathered all possible along their route they were finally absolutely dismounted and troops were in such a position that it seemed probable that the entire band would be captured or killed. But just at this juncture they succeeded in remounting themselves with the best stock in the country, and finding that it would be impossible to get north of the railroad, they returned to Mexico, Captain Viele, 10th Cavalry, followed them with two troops as far as Ascension, Chihuahua, from which point, further pursuit being useless, he returned with his jaded command to his camp in Cave Canon. The remounting of the hostiles was in this instance particularly exasperating. The cattle men of the San Simon had gathered in White Tail Canon, on the east side of the Chiricahuas for

the beginning of the Fall round up. In spite of warning which they received the evening before, that Indians on foot had been seen in the vicinity, they lariatied their cow ponies the best stock in the country, around a ranch in which they all slept. In the morning all their stock with the exception of two or three were gone and the Indians had secured about thirty of the best horses in Arizona. This is not an isolated instance. Several times before and since parties of Indians have been dismounted by persistent pursuit and escaped in the same way by securing remounts; and this too in spite of constant warning and importunities to ranch men to secure their stock. The Indians acted as if they could take stock with perfect impunity. At one time they took a quantity of stock from a corral belonging to the Sulphur Springs Cattle Company, under circumstances that make it evident that several men who were on the ranch knew what was going on, and although there were only three Indians in the party, no attempt was made to prevent the stock being taken. At another time early in June a party of Indians numbering perhaps a dozen men and forty or fifty women and children drove up and shot down several beeves within a mile of the largest ranch in Arizona in broad daylight, there were 20 cow-boys on the ranch at the time, and all fully armed, and yet the Indians went into camp and cooked the meat, and sometime during the night left; and during all this time not the slightest attempt was made to interfere with them or even to give information to troops. The Indians having returned to Mexico, the troops were sent back to their field stations, the scouts having been constantly on the march since the beginning of operations, and the terms of service of many of them having expired, it was thought best to discharge them and enlist others, while the new commands were being organized, so as thoroughly as possible refit and reorganize the pack trains which by this time were almost worn out the new commands were fitted out as soon as possible and on Nov. 27th, Captain Davis again started into Mexico. Captain Crawford was detained by a fruitless pursuit of a raiding party under Josanie and did not cross the line until about two weeks later. The raid of the party of 11 Indians who succeeded in eluding the troops on the line and went into New Mexico by the Lake Palomas trail early in November will not be reported at length, as this raid was mentioned in a special report dated January 11th, 1886. "copy herewith marked E," and the operations incident thereto treated at length. It is mentioned as showing the danger and difficulties to be contended against from small parties. During the period of about four weeks this band travelled probably not less than 1200 miles, killed 38 people, captured and wore out about 250 head of stock; and though twice dismounted, succeeded in crossing back into Mexico with the loss of but one, who was killed by friendly Indians whose camp they attacked near Fort Apache. At one time it seemed probable that the band would be captured, but the refusal of the party of Navajo scouts under Lieutenant Scott 13th Infantry, to follow the trail in the mountains and a severe storm and snow and rain coming on, which lasted for three days obliterating all trails as fast as made, enabled the raiders to choose their own route into Mexico. For details connected with the movements of Captain Davis' command in Mexico I respectfully refer to the attached reports of this officer "marked F. & G respectively." The first expedition of Captain Crawford is well covered by the report of Lieutenant Britton Davis, attached "marked H" It is to be regretted that the death of Captain Crawford at a time

when there is reason to believe that had he lived he would have received the unconditional surrender of Geronimo's and Natchez' bands, has prevented a detailed report of all the operations pertaining to his first expedition. The report of Lieutenant Maus of the events of his second expedition is attached, marked I, the detailed reports of the engagement with the Indians by Captain Crawford's command, and the subsequent death of this gallant officer in an attack upon his command by Mexican force is fully traversed in attached reports of Lieutenant Maus, marked K.&L., who assumed command upon his death. From these reports it appears that on the 10th of January Captain Crawford after an exceedingly difficult night march attacked the Indians camp near the Arras river about sixty miles below Nacori. Though the attack did not result in the destruction of the Indians for the reason shown, yet the scouts captured all of the hostiles stock and supplies of every description, and convinced them that they could never hope to find a secure resting place; and they accordingly asked for a conference with Captain Crawford to take place the following morning. What its results would have been cannot of course be positively stated, but as he was thoroughly known to all the Indians, and had their confidence, it is believed that he was the only white man besides myself who could have induced the hostiles to surrender.

Unfortunately the scouts, worn out with three days incessant marching, for 48 hours without food, and under the circumstances fearing no attack by the hostiles, did not keep watch with their usual vigilance. The morning of the 11th before full daylight they were attacked in their sleep by a force of 154 Mexicans. By the first volley three of the scouts were wounded before they could get the shelter of the rocks. By the exertions of their officers the firing was stopped and every effort was made to explain to the Mexicans that they were attacking a friendly force. The Mexicans were told in Spanish that the Indians were American Scouts and that the officers in command were American officers. During this interval the Mexicans approached so near that their words could be distinguished. Captain Crawford took his position on a rock without arms within easy speaking distance of them. He pointed out that he was in uniform. At the same time Mr. Horn the interpreter was explaining who they were. Suddenly without warning, a Mexican within 20 or 30 yards with Captain Crawford raised his piece and fired. Crawford fell, shot through the brain. This shot seemed to be agreed upon signal as at once the firing became general. Mr. Horn was shot through the arm but though the firing lasted for several minutes and was only stopped when the Mexicans had lost their commanding officer and their second in command and at least two others killed and several wounded, that it was discovered that not one of the scouts was touched, and had it not been for the exertions of Lieutenants Maus and Shipp and the two Chiefs of Scouts who finally succeeded in stopping the firing of the scouts, many more of the attacking party would have been killed. In the light of the events of the day following, when Lieut. Maus was detained by force in the Mexican camp and was only allowed to return when the scouts began to strip for action, upon his word of honor that he would send them six of his eleven pack mules, the conclusion reached by Lieutenant Maus, that the Mexicans knew whom they were attacking, is almost incontrovertible, the death of Captain Crawford was in any event an assassination. The

day following the Mexicans attacked the hostiles again as to talk, but Captain Crawford was insensible, practically dead, though his death did not occur until the eighth day, and their interview with Lieutenant Maus only resulted in their expressing a wish for a conference with myself at a point indicated about 25 miles south of San Bernardino. This conference took place in the Canon de los Embudos on the 25th of March. I found the hostiles in camp on a rocky hill surrounded on all sides by ravines and canons through which the hostiles could escape to the higher peaks behind in the event of an attack. They were in superb physical condition and armed to the teeth, with all the ammunition they could carry. In manner they were suspicious and at the same time independent and self-reliant. Lieutenant Maus was with his battalion of scouts camped on lower ground, separated by a deep rugged canon from their position and distant about five hundred or six hundred yards. The hostiles refused to allow any nearer approach. I was conscious that in agreeing to meet them I was placing myself in a position similar to that in which General Canby lost his life and that any incident which might, with or without cause, excite their suspicion would result in my death, and probably that of some of the officer with me. I therefore endeavored to induce them to meet me within the United States, urging that the presence of white soldiers would prevent any attempt of the Mexicans to attack them. But no argument would move them. Into their hands I must trust myself or back they would go into their mountain fastnesses. The report of the conference has been made in full. A copy is herewith marked M,. After my first talk it seemed as if they would accept no terms other than that they be allowed to return to their reservation upon the status antebellum. This I positively declined and the conference broke up. That night I got emissaries into their camp but the hostiles were so excited that they would listen to nothing. The Indians whom I had employed told me that they did not dare even talk to them about surrendering. Geronimo told his people to keep their guns in their hands and to be ready to shoot at a moments notice. The Indians said that the slightest circumstance which would look suspicious would be a signal for firing to begin; that they would kill all they could and scatter to the mountains. Even after they surrendered to me they did not cease their vigilance. They kept mounted men constantly on the watch; there were never more than from five to eight of their men in our camp at one time, and even after the march northward began, the hostiles did not keep together but scattered over the country in parties of two and three. At night they camped in the same way and had I desired it would have been an absolute impossibility to have seized more than half a dozen of them. The last conference with the hostiles took place on the afternoon of March 27th. That night whiskey or mescal was smuggled into their camp and many of them were drunk. The next morning Chihuahua reported the fact, but told me they would all begin the move to the border. In order that I might be within telegraphic condition with the War Department, I deemed it essential that I should return to Fort Bowie immediately, and I accordingly left the camp, leaving my interpreters and the trusted Indians whom I had employed in my negotiations, with Lieutenant Maus, who with his battalion of scouts was to conduct the hostiles to Fort Bowie. The first day the command marched to the supply camp about twelve miles south of San Bernardino and the next day they camped at the smugglers springs

near the border. Owing to the persistent sale of intoxicating liquor to the Indians by a man named Tribolet I gave directions that the ranch should be so guarded that no liquors could be obtained by the Indians. It seems that from the time the scouts had been in camp south of San Bernardino, this man had been selling them large quantities of liquor and that when the hostiles came in he began selling to them and boasted on the large amounts of money he was making in the traffic. The exertions of Lieutenant Maus and his officers did not prevent the hostiles obtaining liquor from this same source the night of the 29th, though the day before all which could be found by careful search, some fifteen gallons had been destroyed. The night of the 29th the hostiles were apparently sober and two dispatches from Lieutenant Maus (copies attached marked N & O) indicated that there would be no difficulty in continuing the march without trouble but the Indians were in that condition of mind that any remark with reference to what would happen to them when they finally got into power excited them. It is understood and I believe that such remarks were made by interested parties, and that in consequence thereof Geronimo and Natchez with 20 bucks stampeded sometime during the night, taking with them two horses and one mule, and fourteen women and two young boys. Several days afterwards two of these men returned and said they were sleeping together and heard people leaving camp and supposed something was wrong and left also; but the next morning they concluded that there was no reason for their leaving and started back, joining Lieutenant Maus about 15 miles from this post. After the most careful inquiry I am satisfied that no one in the camp except those who left, knew anything about it until next morning, and it is probable that a number of those leaving were frightened away at the last moment. Under the circumstances it would have been impossible to have prevented their escaping. Lieutenant Maus with eighty scouts of his battalion immediately started in pursuit. For the details of this march see accompanying report (marked P). Captain Dorst, 4th Cavalry, with the first battalion of Indians scouts were also put on the trail. The result of his scout has not yet been reported. The remainder of the prisoners arrived at Fort Bowie on April 2nd, and on the 7th instant, in compliance with telegraphic instructions of the Secretary of War, left Bowie Station under charge of 1st Lieutenant J. R. Richards, Jr., 4th Cavalry, under escort of a company of the 8th Infantry for Fort Marion, San Agustine, Florida. They numbered 77,-fifteen bucks, thirty three women and twenty nine children. Among the warriors sent to Fort Marion are Chihuahua and his brother Josanie, who led the raid in November and December, and also several others of almost equal prominence, the Indians say the ablest and bravest of the hostiles. With the prisoners are two wives and three children of Geronimo, the family of Natchez, and also families and relatives of all the hostiles who remain out. The latter consists of Geronimo and Natchez with 18 men. Mangus with three men are also out, but where is not known, he having separated from the other Indians in August last, since which time nothing has been heard of him. There is no evidence showing that his band have had any part in the outrages committed by the other renegades and he will doubtless surrender when he can be communicated with.

There were 34 men and 8 well grown boys who left the reserva-

tion in May last and two boys have since grown large enough to carry arms, making 44 in all. There are now in Geronimo's party 20, with Mangus 4, total 24. Before closing this report I desire to express my appreciation of the conduct of the officers and men of my command during the dreary months they have been engaged in their discouraging and well nigh hopeless task. Where all have done well it seems invidious to mention individuals, but while my thanks are due to all, it seems proper to mention the names of Captain Wirt Davis, 4th Cavalry, the lamented Crawford who sleeps in a soldiers grave, Lieutenant M. W. Day, 9th Cavalry, 1st Lieutenant M. P. Maus, 1st Infantry, Lieutenant Britton Davis, 3d Cavalry, Lieutenants C. P. Elliott, R. D. Walsh and H. G. Benson, 4th Cavalry, Leighton Finley and W. E. Shipp, 10th Cavalry and S.L. Faison, 1st Infantry, who commanded expeditions or scout companies in Mexico, and bore uncomplainingly the almost incredible fatigues and privations as well as the dangers incident to their operations.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) George Crook,
Brigadier General,
Commanding.

A true copy:

1st Lieutenant 10th Cavalry,
Aide-de-Camp.